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ABSTRACT 
The Impact of Chinese Investments on the Kenyan Economy 
by Candice S. Newcomb 
The involvement of China in Kenya has been increasing in recent years. China’s investments in 
Kenya are still impacting the Kenyan economy significantly. This thesis will examine the positive 
and negative impacts that the Chinese investments have had on the Kenyan economy.  
This thesis will also address the role that the Kenyan government plays in the facilitating of the 
Chinese investments. It will highlight the importance the Kenyan government has in prioritizing 
policies such as labor laws for the Kenyan people. The Kenyan government has a responsibility to 
protect its citizens from the negative impacts of Chinese investments such as unfair competition 
in the market. The same policies can also be used to create an environment of good relations 
between Kenya and China and more importantly, positive economic growth for Kenya.  
Finally, the paper will look into ways that Kenya and China can both benefit from their partnership, 
rather than the current deals which unilaterally benefit the Chinese government and a few corrupt 
Kenyan oligarchy.  
The methodology for this thesis project is from secondary academic data, acquired from online 
sources, news articles, as well as information from sources found in various libraries in Kenya. 
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 1 Introduction 
My interest in this project started from experiencing firsthand the Chinese investments' 
consequences on the Kenyan economy. I grew up in the Kenyan countryside in a small town called 
Limuru, about forty-five minutes from Nairobi, the capital city. While living in Kenya, I was 
puzzled by China and Kenya's economic partnership and wondered if the connection could be 
mutually beneficial for both countries and economies.  
During my childhood, all the shopping centers and malls had been in Nairobi. Yet, 
Nairobi's city was too far of a distance to drive whenever my family needed to go shopping. Our 
family often chose to shop in nearby markets in our town of Limuru. In Limuru, most shops in the 
market and private vendors sold locally produced textiles, garments, shoes, fruits, and vegetables. 
There were also more exciting and simple items that the hawkers would sell on the streets, such as 
baked goods and handmade crafts. There is also a section of the market in Limuru designated just 
for secondhand clothes that were known as 'mitumba.' The 'mitumba' clothes were satisfactory for 
the low price point they were sold at, because most of them were donated to Kenya for free from 
non-profit organizations from other countries such as the United States, Germany, and France1. 
Through this partnership, venders that sold ‘mitumba’ earned adequate money to survive and 
support their families.  
1 Gloriasb Dailykos, “Do African Nations want your second-hand clothes? Yes and No”, June 30. 2017, 
https://www.alternet.org/2017/06/do-african-nations-want-your-second-hand-clothes-yes-and-no/ 
2 
However, over the last few years, the vendors at the Limuru market started to lose business. 
I began to hear many of the vendors complain about the sudden influx of cheap Chinese products 
that many people preferred to buy rather than buy their products.  The Chinese imports were 
displacing many local producers, and as a result, the textile and clothing sector, which is 20 percent 
of all formal manufacturing employment in Kenya, was adversely affected.  The majority of those 
working in the formal manufacturing employment sector are women, thus many women were 
affected and lost their jobs2. My neighbors and those in my community of Limuru were laid off 
and lost their shops.  
When I went back to Limuru last year, it was a heartbreaking sight to see. The Limuru 
marketplace that was once so vibrant and busy was suddenly struggling. There was also evidence 
of the increasing number of Chinese investments, especially the sheer number of construction 
projects. For example, Kenyans talked about the new railway, which was under construction that 
would allow people to travel in just half the usual time. There was an influx of new roads that were 
under construction at a record pace. The Chinese investments had already affected many people in 
my neighborhood, positively and negatively. These events sparked my interest in the economic 
partnership between China and Kenya and raised questions of the history between the two 
countries and the current state and future impact of this partnership for the Kenyan people. 
1.1 Background of the Study 
The relations between Kenya and China began in the 1950s before Kenya gained its 
independence in 1963. This paper will describe the gradual adjustments that the Chinese migrants 
2 Apurva Sanghi & Dylan Johnson, “Deal or No Deal: Strictly business for China in Kenya?” World Bank group, 
March. 2016, https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-7614 
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went through over the years in Kenya and describe how the history of China and Kenya relations 
has deepened over the years. It will explain Chinese migrants' historical progression from working 
at Chinese restaurants to owning Chinese restaurants, trading, and investing in Kenya.  
This study will show how the China and Kenya relations progressed from President Moi's 
regimes to Kibaki and to now, President Uhuru. The most significant investment that China has 
had so far in Kenya has been the Belt Road Initiative (BRI). As a result of this investment, Kenya's 
overall debt is the fifth highest in Africa. Kenya's public debt has surpassed 50 Billion dollars. As 
that amount makes up for 60% of Kenya's gross domestic product, China has become Kenya's 
largest creditor.3 Thus, Kenya presently owes 72% of its bilateral debt and 21% of its overall debt 
to China.4 
As a country, Kenya is importing more than it is exporting, which is negatively affecting 
the Kenyan economy.  The typical business practice in Kenya is that local Chinese businesses are 
importing cheap goods from China. This business practice makes it almost impossible for the 
markets of the local Kenyans to compete. Though many Kenyan owned businesses competed with 
each other over the years, many Kenyan companies have no choice but to close down, due to the 
unfair competition of Chinese imported goods and the increased number of these imports from 
China. This study will look deeper into how the businesses owned by local Kenyans are being 
affected by the increasing competition and business practices by both the Chinese government and 
3 Andrea Begleiter, "The Dragon Stretches its Wings: Assessing the Geopolitical and Economic Implications of 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Pakistan and Kenya.” College Undergraduate Research Electronic Journal, 1 
March 2019, https://repository.upenn.edu/curej/227. 
4 Ibid. 
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the Chinese migrants living in Kenya. The competition comes from the local businesses selling 
imported Chinese goods. 
1.3 Research Design and Methods 
This study is based on secondary research, and the information gathered is from existing 
literature, books, news articles, journals, academic thesis, and online databases. The paper begins 
with an overview of China and Kenya's history and provides information on the different aspects 
of diplomatic relations that each Kenyan president had with China. This study will also touch on 
Kenya's political background and explain the Kenyan political culture, which involves high levels 
of corruption among the group of elites in the country. This study will explain Kenya's political 
environment and how the local elites set up beneficial policies, but detrimental for the average 
Kenyan. The analysis of the differing views between Kenyan government leaders and its citizens 
is crucial in understanding the polar responses to China's aid and setting the stage for the initiative's 
global response. 
 By providing an overview of Kenya's economic background and   history between Kenya- 
China relations, the paper will highlight the cultural issues that continue to shape how Chinese 
employers interact and manage their Kenyan employees. These cultural issues start from China 
and Kenya, having different government forms to competing ideologies and even cultural contrasts 
in leadership and management. In many cases, the workplace's Chinese social norms can be 
understood as abuse and even racial discrimination toward Kenyan employees. The consequences 
of such cultural differences, combined with other issues such as violations of labor laws and 
environmental laws, have created hostile work environments and hostility outside of the 
workplace. For example, many Chinese migrants in Kenya are private and individual entrepreneurs 
seeking job opportunities in Kenya. Though the Chinese government has not sent many Chinese 
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migrants, many Kenyan citizens have negative perspectives on the Chinese migrants due to the 
cultural differences, ideologies, and even views on the Chinese government. Furthermore, many 
Kenyans' hostility and negative outlook have expanded in regard to the current trade partnership 
between the two countries.  
In order to corroborate and expound on the cultural issues and local Kenyan perspectives 
to these issues, the information will be gathered from Kenyan newspapers such as the Daily 
Nation, The Star, and The Standard. Through these news articles, this study will disclose the local 
sentiment of the Kenyan people and their responses to issues such as the discrimination in the 
workplace, the current policies between China and Kenya, and the violation of labor and 
environmental laws. This study's primary investment is highlighting the relationship between 
China and Kenya through the analysis of the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) and the Standard Gauge 
Railway (SGR). Since Chinese investors have taken control of most of the infrastructure and 
construction projects, the reactions have been mixed from Kenyans and the international 
community. By understanding Kenya's historical, political, and economic background, this study 
will portray and illustrate how China's first investments were welcome by the Kenyan political 
leaders and the elite of Kenya.  
After seeing the fruit of the early investments, such as new roads constructed at rapid speed, 
many Kenyan citizens were also optimistic and welcomed this partnership. Yet, this positive 
perspective of this new partnership started to change. For many Kenyans, the influx of cheap 
Chinese imports, continued violation of labor laws have currently created an atmosphere of 
skepticism towards Chinese investors. By giving insight into these changes in cultural perception 
and perspective, this study will set the background to examine the current opaque deals that the 
Kenyan government has presently signed with the Chinese government. One current deal has 
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Mombasa Port, Kenya's largest port, as a form of collateral in the loan from China's Exim bank. 
The details of these opaque deals and the secrecy in which features are not readily available give 
many Kenyans and the international community concern and create distrust towards the Chinese 
government, Chinese businesses, firms, and Chinese migrants.  
  In addition to the news articles, most of the information gathered for this study are from 
cited books, academic journals, and publications from around the world to give a better perspective 
on not only the history of international relations between China and Kenya, but also provide better 
insight into the history, culture, and economics of Kenya. By using a compilation of different 
scholars from not only Kenya but around the world, this study can give insight on the same issues 
from different perspectives. It was also imperative for this study to have a clear understanding of 
not only the Kenyan culture and background, but also the Chinese one as well. For example, the 
knowledge of the Chinese perspective in the workplace, it was essential to gather literature from 
Chinese authors and scholars such as Jiing-Lih Farh and Bor-Shiuan Cheng. In the best efforts be 
objective and impartial, Western academic journals and publications were also combined with 
Chinese scholars to not paint a biased view on Chinese involvement in Kenya. 
 However, finding sources on some current issues and policies were a challenge. China's 
government is historically known to be reserved in the disclosure of any matters on internal affairs. 
Therefore, there is no academic or authoritative source from China or the Chinese media on the 
present Belt and Road Initiative. Thus, it limits the inquiry and depth of investigation of the 
Chinese perspective and stance on this policy and surrounding issues. Additionally, much of the 
research being conducted on the Belt and Road Initiative as the project is still ongoing, which 
means that most of the reporting is based on temporarily valid observations. However, the BRI has 
sparked the international interest of academic scholars and policymakers and governments 
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worldwide. Many publications and journalists have chosen to investigate and write on this issue 
such as The New York Times, BBC, Aljazeera, Foreign Policy, Financial Times and others. Lastly, 
the nature of the research is ongoing as the final impact of the current policies between China and 
Kenya are still unknown, but the study and analysis of the Chinese systems and investments in 
Kenya is crucial to Kenya's social, political, and economic present and future.  
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 2 Literature Review  
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter will discuss the literature on the theoretical framework of the Chinese 
investments in Kenya and how these investments are specifically impactful due to Kenya's distinct 
economic, political, socio-cultural, and technological factors. This chapter's information was 
sourced from books, past theses, online journals, and government articles. The section's 
presentation and flow will show the literature on each theme and subtheme of the paper. 
2.2 Political Factors  
As Chinese investments have increased in African countries over the years, many African 
countries and the citizens have welcomed the capital and know-how of new skills5. However, there 
are rising concerns in the developed countries, specifically the Western countries, on whether 
China would bring hope or problems6.  The phrase ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ is said to reflect Western 
anxieties and not African realities. The concern about debt- trap diplomacy stems from the fact 
that Kenya's amount of debt has raised alarms of potential risks to Kenyan sovereignty7.   The 
critics view the BRI in Kenya as a neocolonial venture. By partnering with China, Kenya would 
result in an environment that encourages corruption, reduces governance standards, and the 
                                                 
5 Kennedy Mwengei, “A Study on the Impact of China's Investments in Africa; the Case of Kenya.” Finance 
Management, 23 Mar. 2013, www.elixirpublishers.com/articles/1364041481_56A (2013) 13706-13714.pdf. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Andrea Begleiter, "The Dragon Stretches its Wings: Assessing the Geopolitical and Economic Implications of 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Pakistan and Kenya.” College Undergraduate Research Electronic Journal, 1 
March 2019, https://repository.upenn.edu/curej/227. 
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Kenyan population would be indoctrinated to support the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). On 
the other hand, those who support the Kenya- China partnership view the BRI as an opportunity 
to receive funding to develop Kenya's infrastructure, especially since Western lenders have 
minimized their international development programs8.  
Along with the skepticism that the critics may have regarding the planning, financing, and 
implementation of the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR), the controversies are rooted in the Kenyan 
political culture, where there are high levels of corruption among the group of elites in the country. 
This political culture reflects negatively on Chinese developers who are viewed as partnering with 
corrupt politicians9. The root of the problem is found within the policies put in place by the local 
elites who benefit and other outside actors, rather than the masses, as well as the global system 
that allows the perpetuation of those policies to be viewed as fair10.  Politics plays a vital role in 
the development and growth of international trade between Kenya and China, which happens by 
controlling taxes, regulations, and offering security. The political climate and stability affect how 
the investors will react. If the political instability is high, then it will most likely scare the investors 
away11.   
                                                 
8 Andrea Begleiter, "The Dragon Stretches its Wings: Assessing the Geopolitical and Economic Implications of 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Pakistan and Kenya.” College Undergraduate Research Electronic Journal, 1 
March 2019, https://repository.upenn.edu/curej/227.  
9 Uwe Wissenbach, “African politics meets Chinese engineers: The Chinese- built standard gauge railway project in 
Kenya and East Africa.” Chinese research initiative, June. 2017, 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5652847de4b033f56d2bdc29/t/594d739f3e00bed37482d4fe/1498248096443/S
GR+v4.pdf 
10 Nils Ståhlkrantz, “The Tiger in the Cage: Discourse Surrounding China's Engagement in Kenya The Tiger in the 
Cage.” ResearchGate, Uppsala University, Jan. 2018, 
www.researchgate.net/publication/322696283_The_Tiger_in_the_Cage_Discourse_Surrounding_China's_Engagem
ent_in_Kenya_The_Tiger_in_the_Cage. 
11 Nguku Grace Wanjiru, “External environmental factors influencing China- Kenya trade: A case study of the 
ministry of foreign affairs and international trade and Chinese embassy in Kenya.”  Semantic Scholars, University of 
Nairobi, Nov. 2013, pdfs.semanticscholar.org/dc28/ec1588929da597c6497d86218a8d7c08a2d6.pdf. 
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2.3 Economic Factors  
The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), also known as the New Silk Road, is an 
ambitious infrastructure project launched by President Xi Jinping in 201312.  The BRI is a 
multinational, trillion-dollar development project that aims to improve connections by land and 
sea between China and its economic partners in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Europe through 
infrastructure plans. It has become the most prominent development initiative in history13. One of 
the two critical components of the BRI is the 21st century Maritime Silk Road (MSR), which 
emphasizes Kenya. 
The MSR initiative focuses on the core projects that involve the upgrading of the Mombasa 
Port, the building of a new ultra-modern port in Lamu, and the construction of a new standard 
gauge railway line (SGR). The SGR links the Mombasa port, the capital Nairobi, and the land-
locked neighboring countries. The estimated cost of the railway line is US$25 billion, 90 percent 
of which is financed by China EXIM Bank14. This commercial project is essential for China 
because it has become a country that depends on exporting its manufactured products. Also, the 
highways, railways, and pipelines will run two ways that will make it easier for China to get things 
out, but it would make it easier to get crucial raw materials in15.  The Belt Road Initiative includes 
one-third of the world trade and GDP and over 60% of the world’s population16.  
                                                 
12 Andrew Chatzky and James McBride, “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative,” Jan 28.2020, 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative 
13 Farooq Sabil Muhammad, “Kenya and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.” World Scientific, 6 Mar. 2020, 
www.worldscientific.com/doi/pdf/10.1142/S2377740018500136. 
14 Ibid.  
15 Andrea Begleiter, "The Dragon Stretches its Wings: Assessing the Geopolitical and Economic Implications of 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Pakistan and Kenya.” College Undergraduate Research Electronic Journal, 1 
March 2019, https://repository.upenn.edu/curej/227. 
16 Caroline Freund, “Belt and Road Initiative.” The World Bank, 29 Mar. 2018, www.worldbank.org/en/topic/regional-
integration/brief/belt-and-road-initiative.print. 
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There have been heated debates among various economists from Kenya and other nations 
about whether China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) will bring sustainable economic 
development. The arguments are based on the level of debt in Kenya, which is an alarming 
indicator of doubt and the possible fallout. BRI contracts suggest that the port in Mombasa would 
be held as collateral for SGR loans17.  The loss of the Mombasa port would be detrimental to the 
Kenyan economy because it is the busiest and largest seaport in Kenya, serving the hinterland by 
exporting critical agricultural products and supporting the foundation of the Kenyan economy18. 
There are also mixed reactions towards the impact of China’s diplomatic relations, trade, Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI), and aid to Kenya because there are both pros and cons. These gains and 
losses range from cheap imports for both consumer and producer goods and create unfair 
competition among the local producers. When the local producers lose business, it extends to the 
local firms which collapse because they cannot cope with the competition. As a result of this loss, 
the employees lose their jobs, and it increases the level of unemployment19. 
 China has become Kenya’s biggest trading partner over the last decade. It accounts for 
17.2 percent of Kenya’s total trade, with exports to China adding up to $167 Million against 
imports, total to $3.78 billion20. These figures alarm critics who label Kenya and China’s trade as 
imbalanced at best. 21 It is worrisome to many critics and Kenyan citizens who view the bilateral 
17 Andrea Begleiter, "The Dragon Stretches its Wings: Assessing the Geopolitical and Economic Implications of 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Pakistan and Kenya.” College Undergraduate Research Electronic Journal, 1 
March 2019, https://repository.upenn.edu/curej/227. 
18 World port source, “Port of Mombasa”, 
http://www.worldportsource.com/ports/commerce/KEN_Port_of_Mombasa_1365.php#:~:text=It%20has%20been%
20the%20hub,foundation%20of%20the%20Kenyan%20economy. 
19 Kennedy Mwengei, “A Study on the Impact of China's Investments in Africa; the Case of Kenya.” Finance 
Management, 23 Mar. 2013, www.elixirpublishers.com/articles/1364041481_56A (2013) 13706-13714.pdf. 
20 Karen Kandie, “Leveling Kenya- China trade imbalance”, May 2. 2019, https://www.the-
star.co.ke/business/commentary/2019-05-02-leveling-kenya--china-trade-imbalance/ 
21 Ibid.  
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trade deficit as a threat to the economy and believe that it is best to embrace a more trade 
effectiveness policy than aid effectiveness as a strategy to improve and strengthen Kenya economic 
growth22. 
 Generally, when many Kenya and China officials consider trade, they usually are 
concerned with the bilateral trade deficit. However, it is a meaningless statistic, as a country can 
have simultaneous surpluses and deficits with many different trading partners and still have a 
positive balance overall. The overall trade deficit in Kenya is of concern to the policymakers as 
well. The consumers are profiting, but the policymakers fear that local producers are at a loss from 
cheap Chinese goods. Others have even argued that the imports are hurting Kenya’s prospects of 
industrialization23.   
One of the biggest trends in international trade is the increasing gap between the rich and 
the poor. This gap is because the terms of business are usually unfair, such that the developed 
nation benefits while the developing nations get the raw deal, which can be termed as modern-day 
imperialism24. It is also common for corporations from developed nations to relocate their labor to 
developing countries such as Kenya, take advantage of the low costing labor, and weak 
environmental laws, which leads to increasing environmental degradation as the rich keep getting 
rich. At the same time, the poor do not gain as much from the deal25. 
                                                 
22 Elijah Siringi, “Kenya China Trade Relations’, August. 2018, Journal of Economics and Finance, 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326920414_Kenya_China_Trade_Relations 
23 Apurva Sanghi & Dylan Johnson, “Deal or No Deal: Strictly business for China in Kenya?” World Bank group, 
March. 2016, https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-7614 
24 Nguku Grace Wanjiru, “External environmental factors influencing China- Kenya trade: A case study of the ministry 
of foreign affairs and international trade and Chinese embassy in Kenya.”  Semantic Scholars, University of Nairobi, 
Nov. 2013, pdfs.semanticscholar.org/dc28/ec1588929da597c6497d86218a8d7c08a2d6.pdf. 
25 Ibid. 
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The paradox in development economics is the “resource curse,” which is when many 
countries with abundant natural resources, have a reduced growth performance. The 'resource 
curse' is most common in Sub- Saharan Africa26.    This weak growth performance shows that the 
capital-intensive natural resource abundance creates opportunities for rent-seeking behavior, 
which is an essential factor in determining a country’s level of corruption. In this case, rent-seekers 
are people such as civil servants, who embezzle funds and resources, demand bribes from their 
clients or avoid paying taxes to the government by getting their goods transported across 
unpatrolled borders27. Rent-seekers are also entrepreneurs who lobby for measures to reduce 
competition to sell their products at higher prices. The motive behind rent-seeking is self-
enrichment, power extension or yielding to the demands of powerful interests groups led by the 
government28.  
In the case of the trade deals between China and Kenya, rent-seeking behavior 
opportunities are available. There are high levels of corruption in the Kenyan government and 
among the local elite members of society. Despite the good intentions to promote sustainable 
development in Kenya, the developing strategy often fails to guide individual activities into 
productive areas in the past29. Instead, many state interventions offered privileged people 
opportunities to gain income in a nonproductive or even destructive ways30. 
                                                 
26 Ali Zafar, “The Growing Relationship between China and Sub-Saharan Africa: Macroeconomic, Trade, Investment, 
and Aid Links.” The World Bank, 20 Apr. 2007, documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/617301468003942566/The-
growing-relationship-between-China-and-Sub-Saharan-Africa-macroeconomic-trade-investment-and-aid-links. 
27 Pius Fischer, “rent-seeking institutions reforms- Theory and empirical evidence for Tanzania”, Sep.2004, 
https://ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/nadel-
dam/documents/publications/Fischer_Pius_PhD_Rent_Seeking.pdf 
28 Ibid. 
29
Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
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2.4 Socio-cultural Factors 
According to The New York Times article, some Kenyans believe that the influx of Chinese 
immigrants has led to racism and discrimination against the native population31.  One of the main 
areas that generate racism and discrimination in the labor relations between the Chinese employers 
and Kenyan employees is the cultural difference.  Chinese investors and local workers have 
different views on labor rights. Also, the politicization of these issues further complicates some of 
these situations32. For instance, what Kenyan employees would consider being overworked and as 
abuse, is not necessarily how the Chinese employers would view it. The Chinese Ambassador to 
Kenya, Sun Baohong, defended the allegations on abuse of Kenya SGR workers as “little 
punishment.” Ambassador Sun Baohong said, “It is little punishment and part of team building 
which all Chinese including me do. Maybe, if it is found to be offensive to Kenyans, then the 
company can change to another exercise”. The Ambassador has blamed the conflict between 
Kenyan and Chinese workers on cultural differences and said, “It will take time for them to 
socialize and fully engage with one another.”33 
 According to Farh and Cheng (2000), the legitimacy of authoritarian leadership in China 
originates from the family relationships regulated by Confucianism. As the grandfather has 
complete authority over other members of the family, he should be obeyed. Thus, the 
                                                 
31 Andrea Begleiter, "The Dragon Stretches its Wings: Assessing the Geopolitical and Economic Implications of 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Pakistan and Kenya.” College Undergraduate Research Electronic Journal, 1 
March 2019, https://repository.upenn.edu/curej/227. 
32 Ying Xia, “Chinese Agricultural and Manufacturing Investment in Kenya: a Scoping Study.” Chinese Africa 
Research Initiative, Aug. 2019, 
www.static1.squarespace.com/static/5652847de4b033f56d2bdc29/t/5d657c6d44756300019e37ad/1566932078004/
WP 30 Xia Chinese Investment Kenya.pdf. 
33 Angeline Mbogo, “Communication barriers blamed for low skills transfer from Chinese to Kenyans working on 
SGR”, Aug 1. 2018, The Kenyan Wallstreet, https://kenyanwallstreet.com/communication-barriers-blamed-for-low-
skills-transfer-from-chinese-to-kenyans-working-on-sgr/ 
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patriarchalism in the family affects other social organizations such as leaders, company managers, 
who take on the father role and the employees take the part of the children34. The inequalities 
between the supervisors and the subordinates are expected, and the subordinates tend to rely on 
the leader’s orders with little or no explanation. Kirkman et al. (2009) states that this form of 
thinking is derived from the power distance orientation that influences a person’s beliefs about 
status, authority and power distribution in an organization35. Many Chinese employees regard 
power distance orientation positively. They prefer authoritarian leadership, and that is where a lot 
of the clashes between the Chinese employers and the Kenyan workers occur. The Chinese mindset 
and worldview about leadership are not universal, and thus both parties need to be informed about 
the cultural differences.  
Despite the perception of Chinese presence in Africa as a neocolonialist strategy led by the 
Chinese state, a study done by Ruti Ejangue shows that the Chinese migrant population in Kenya 
is diverse. There are different independent actors with personal and economic motives separate 
from the Chinese government in the Chinese migrant population. The Chinese migrants have been 
able to impact the Kenyan social, cultural fabric through the proliferation of the Chinese language, 
food, work ethic, and an increase in interracial relationships. Although Chinese migrants are 
exporting their cultural heritage to Kenyans, many embrace the Kenyan culture and interact with 
the Kenyan communities36. 
                                                 
34 Farh, J.-L., & Cheng, B.-S. (2000). A cultural analysis of paternalistic leadership in Chinese organizations. In J. T. 
Li, A. S. Tsui, & E. Weldon (Eds.), Management and organizations in the Chinese contexts (pp. 84–127). London: 
MacMillan 
35 Kirkman, B. L., Chen, G., Farh, J.-L., Chen, Z. X., & Lowe, K. B. (2009). Individual power distance orientation 
and follower reactions to transformational leaders: A cross-level, cross-cultural examination. Academy of 
Management Journal, 52(4), 744–764. 
36 Ruti Ejangue, “Beyond “Neocolonialism”: Understanding the sociocultural impacts and exchanges between 
Chinese migrants and Kenyans in Nairobi and Kirinyaga country.” School of International Service American 
University, April. 2018, https://www.ncurproceedings.org/ojs/index.php/NCUR2018/article/download/2671/1424 
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2.5 Theoretical Framework  
This section of the chapter provides the literature on some of the international dependence 
models found within the academic field of international relations. The approaches mentioned 
include the neo-colonial approach, the false-paradigm approach, and the dualistic-development 
approach. The methods aim to provide a foundation for understanding the reasoning behind some 
arguments about the development in Kenya and the role that Chinese investments play in relations 
with Kenya and the Kenyan economy.  
According to Griffin and Gurley, the neo-colonial approach argues that those who benefit 
from foreign aid to developing countries are the ruling class group. Their activities and policies 
defy accountability and obstruct any radical reform efforts that could interfere with their base of 
power or benefit the ordinary citizens37.  Many aid donors are external forces with selfish political 
and economic interests in the aid- recipient countries.  Many donors and the ruling elite of recipient 
countries use aid packages, like financial aid, for their purposes. Thus, the neo-colonial approach 
views dependency on foreign aid as political and economic control over the poor developing 
countries by their wealthy established partners. The developing countries' forces help the latter, 
which subjects the developing countries to more severe conditions of backwardness and making 
them even more vulnerable to exploitation38.  
                                                 
37 Griffin & Gurley. “Radical Analyses of Imperialism, the Third World, and the Transition to Socialism: A Survey 
Article”, Journal of Economic Literature , Sep., 1985, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Sep., 1985), pp. 1089- 1143, 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2725460.pdf?casa_token=SKbyblZCVYkAAAAA:dR9ltBTPqmpgUkQafvfp0H-
JgOwwf8t8Px2_zihonivULdai5eZTKYWOMt-
GiuUc0muB8gfgVzvuGdznqQR9WRMOfmBJgkFNi7PaCNt7MJy-PrLqoeU 
38 Richard Ilorah, “Is Africa trapped between foreign aid dependency and failed growth initiatives?” University od 
Limpopo, 2013, http://www.essa2013.org.za/fullpaper/essa2013_2525.pdf 
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The false- paradigm approach by Joseph Stiglitz views underdevelopment and poverty and 
the dependency syndrome in developing countries as the result of a misleading ‘one-size fits all’ 
doctrine that is implemented in developing countries by assuming and naïve international experts 
employed by donor countries39. The majority of the projects carried out by the developing 
countries fail because the policies implemented in the projects serve the interest of an opportunistic 
group of the ruling elite in the developing countries. Those elites happen to control their countries’ 
meager resources along with donor packages. In cases where there is a failure of policies due to 
being advised wrongly, there are more cases of aid dependency, debt and debt-servicing problems 
in developing countries40.   
Marwan Ghandour’s dualistic-development approach argues that the co-existence of 
industrialized developed countries and developing countries have become so entrenched, that it 
only leads to the developed countries getting more productive and the developing countries getting 
poorer41.  These unfair deals among the partners from the developed and developing countries 
make it difficult and hopeless for the developing countries to have a political and economic 
breakthrough and become free of their foreign aid dependency trap42.   
William Stanley Jevons was an economist and philosopher and one of the main contributors 
to the ‘marginal revolution,’ which revolutionized the economic theory and shifted classical to 
                                                 
39 Joseph Stiglitz, “Globalization and Its Discontents”, Economic Notes by Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena Spa, 
vol. 32, no. 2-2003, pp. 123–142, 2002, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1046/j.0391-
5026.2003.00107.x?casa_token=NXV31eKJvIwAAAAA:eFMdRkxPFHOZ3qJr4YDDm8JnqhgoBnRbm4d6UOM8
fnrC-sm15EXpkxDiOf8ndm-ogxi_5biqz5MQ7gg 
40 Ibid. 
41 Marwan Ghandour, “Dualistic development: A new approach”, Sep. 1975, 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/j.1746-1049.1975.tb00355.x 
42 Ibid.  
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neoclassical economics43. In Richard Ilorah’s opinion, the neoclassical view argues that high 
savings, through high investment will lead to growth. It emphasizes the idea that foreign aid would 
promote growth in Africa44. The Harrod-Domar model supports this theory of a direct correlation 
between savings and the gross national product (GNP). The more an economy can save and invest 
from a particular gross national product, with total savings being equal to total investment, the 
higher the GNP's growth rate will be. Therefore, this would imply that foreign aid, to a large extent, 
is as good as saving, and thus, it can play the role of saving to determine investment and 
subsequently, growth. In this way, foreign aid can fill the financing gap between the national 
saving and the investment for a country to achieve sustained growth on its own. A lot of importance 
is placed on savings and investment; however, they are lacking in developing countries45.   
Kenya is a prime example of how each of these approaches is presently impacting the current 
state of China and Kenya relations. The Kenyan government has chosen to follow the neo-classical 
approach to bring prosperity and continued economic growth to Kenya. Kenya has chosen to 
welcome high investments from countries like China, primarily through foreign aid.  For Kenya, 
foreign aid is appealing as another asset to their total GDP and seems beneficial, especially in the 
short-term.  The other three approaches help understand Kenya’s present-day economy and 
government policy as well. The Kenyan government has long sought after China’s rapid economic 
growth and believed that the same pathway of economic success is possible for Kenya as well.  
Kenya has welcomed Chinese investments and tried to copy China’s industrial advancement and 
business practices to achieve the same level of success. However, currently, this has become a 
                                                 
43 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “William Stanley Jevons”, Jan 22. 2007, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/william-jevons/ 
44 Richard Ilorah, “Is Africa trapped between foreign aid dependency and failed growth initiatives?” University od 
Limpopo, 2013, http://www.essa2013.org.za/fullpaper/essa2013_2525.pdf 
45 Ibid.  
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false-paradigm as these practices and investments have been disadvantageous, particularly for 
Kenyan locals. By looking at Kenya through the neo-colonial approach, the investments continue 
to benefit the Chinese investors and the Kenyan oligarchy through corrupt practices such as rent-
seeking.  This paper will address these approaches but focus on the dualist-development approach. 
The latest significant impact seen in Kenya and China relations is Kenya’s present debt and how 
it is damaging the Kenyan local businesses. By studying and understanding each of these 
approaches, this paper will analyze the current effects of China’s investments in Kenya, and the 
future repercussions on the Kenyan government, economy, and people.  
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 3 Analysis 
3.1 History of the Relations between Kenya and China 
 
Relations between Kenya and China started before Kenya gained its independence from 
the British in 1963. In the 1950s and the early 1960s, Kenya exported raw materials such as sisal, 
cotton, and pyrethrum to China, while China was exporting semi-processed products to Kenya 
including tea and base metals46. This partnership was mutually beneficial for both countries. 
Relations between Kenya and China became official in December 1963, when China became the 
fourth country to establish diplomatic ties with the new independent Kenya47. 
Despite the bilateral ties with China, Kenya began to pursue a more western capitalistic 
oriented developmental trajectory. President Kenyatta kept strong relations with the West during 
his regime, and so did President Moi when he became president in 1978. During the first decade 
of President Moi’s government, he maintained secure ties with the West in terms of military and 
economic assistance48. However, after a coup attempt in 1982, there was much criticism of 
                                                 
46 Ying Xia, “Chinese Agricultural and Manufacturing Investment in Kenya: a Scoping Study.” Chinese Africa 
Research Initiative, Aug. 2019, 
www.static1.squarespace.com/static/5652847de4b033f56d2bdc29/t/5d657c6d44756300019e37ad/1566932078004/
WP 30 Xia Chinese Investment Kenya.pdf. 
47 Maggie Opondo, “The Impact of Chinese Firms on CSR in Kenya’s Garment Sector.” International Research 
Network, citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.522.4044&rep=rep1&type=pdf. 
48 Robert M. Maxon, “Historical Dictionary of Kenya” Rowman & Littlefield, 2014, 
https://books.google.com/books?id=BreCBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA103&lpg=PA103&dq=why+did+kenya+face+increa
sing+isolation+from+the+west+during+moi%27s+regime?&source=bl&ots=aeAnWEWqwM&sig=ACfU3U35Syw
Cw4xaol-WAEMuLQubZ4d-
3w&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiikb_wrrrqAhWFhJ4KHREUDX0Q6AEwAHoECAoQAQ#v=onepage&q=why
%20did%20kenya%20face%20increasing%20isolation%20from%20the%20west%20during%20moi's%20regime%
3F&f=false 
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Kenya’s human rights record. Corruption in many media reports in the United States and Britain 
raised problems for Kenya concerning the tightening of authoritarianism49. The pressure 
intensified after the murder of the foreign minister Dr. Robert Ouko.  
In the 1990s, governance issues led to domestic pressure on matters of democratic change, 
which impacted foreign relations. The international scene's crucial changes were brought about by 
the end of the cold war and the end of apartheid in South Africa. As Kenya's economic situation 
was worsening, the need for foreign economic assistance increased50. These factors affected 
Kenya’s relations with the United States, Britain, and other members of the European Union (EU). 
Thus, Kenya faced increasing isolation from the West and chose to partner less with Western 
countries such as the United States, which led Kenya to turn its attention to the East51.  
Each of the former presidents of Kenya has had different diplomatic relations with China. 
During President Jomo Kenyatta’s regime, from 1963- 1978, both Kenyatta and Secretary-General 
Tom J. Mboya did not trust China’s political intentions in Kenya52. In 1964, the Chinese premier 
Chou En-lai made a statement about an “excellent revolutionary situation in Africa” after visiting 
10 African countries53. Given that Kenya had just gained independence in 1963, President Jomo 
Kenyatta expressed that the Chinese premier’s expectation did not apply to Kenya because Kenya 
                                                 
49 Robert M. Maxon, “Historical Dictionary of Kenya” Rowman& Littlefield, 2014, 
https://books.google.com/books?id=BreCBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA103&lpg=PA103&dq=why+did+kenya+face+increa
sing+isolation+from+the+west+during+moi%27s+regime?&source=bl&ots=aeAnWEWqwM&sig=ACfU3U35Syw
Cw4xaol-WAEMuLQubZ4d-
3w&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiikb_wrrrqAhWFhJ4KHREUDX0Q6AEwAHoECAoQAQ#v=onepage&q=why
%20did%20kenya%20face%20increasing%20isolation%20from%20the%20west%20during%20moi's%20regime%
3F&f=false 
50 Ibid. 
51 Maggie Opondo, “The Impact of Chinese Firms on CSR in Kenya’s Garment Sector.” International Research 
Network, citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.522.4044&rep=rep1&type=pdf. 
52 Michael Chege, “Economic relations between Kenya and China, 1963-2007”, 2006, https://csis-website-
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/080603_chege_kenyachina.pdf 
53 Ibid. 
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had completed its anti-colonial revolution. The relations between Kenya and China were tense in 
1965, and there were different views among various cabinet members on this matter. However, 
President Jomo Kenyatta favored having a mixed economy that was mainly directed by the private 
sector with room for producer cooperatives, state-operated enterprises and small-holder production 
for the market54. Hence, President Jomo Kenyatta was more interested in improving cooperation 
with the United States, Britain, and Western Europe. Despite the tension between China and 
Kenya, there was diplomatic cooperation between Kenya and China during President Jomo 
Kenyatta’s era in 1963-1978, which covered issues such as the anti-piracy Corporation, roads, 
Bridges Corporation, and Oil Exploration Corporation, among others55. 
Before President Daniel Arap Moi became president in 1978-2002, he was also among 
those who did not trust China’s intentions in Kenya and accused China of plotting revolution in 
the 1960s. However, once he became president, he expressed his admiration for China’s 
modernization, orderliness, and cleanliness56. President Moi reached out to the Post-Mao People’s 
Republic of China, ready to strengthen Kenya and China's ties. He intended to diversify the sources 
of Kenya’s external development funds. However, he also had a personal plan to secure new 
development projects for his home region in the Rift Valley, to set up his political base. President 
Moi made numerous visits to China and thus opened the door for more negotiations and diplomatic 
relations, which led to lower-level technical exchanges and activities. China did not partner with 
Kenya merely as a donor but as the beneficiary of mutual trade and cooperation. Instead, as a 
developing economy that was modernizing at high speed and transitioning from communist-era 
                                                 
54 Michael Chege, “Economic relations between Kenya and China, 1963-2007”, 2006, https://csis-website-
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/080603_chege_kenyachina 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
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central planning to globally competitive production, China went to Kenya to learn from areas 
where Kenya made outstanding progress like agriculture and tourism57. By 1980, Kenya and China 
made two agreements. The first agreement was on economic and technological cooperation, which 
covers projects such as a new sports stadium, technical support to two universities, scholarships, 
military, and cultural exchanges. The second one involved the transactions of goods between a 
China state trading agency and its equivalent in Kenya58.  
In December 2002, a new government was formed under President Mwai Kibaki, who was 
not only optimistic but in favor of developing strong ties with China.  In August 2005, President 
Mwai Kibaki was accompanied by eleven Kenyan trade and investment-seeking delegates to 
China's visit. During this time, President Mwai Kibaki held extensive talks with President Hu 
Jintao and Chinese government officials. These talks resulted in a five-part agreement covering 
official development assistance in grants for infrastructure and energy, extended air services 
between the two countries, technical support for assessment and classification of standards in 
industrial products, and modernization of equipment and training at the state-owned Kenya 
Broadcasting Corporation59.  
Since then, Kenya has been an essential Chinese ally in international affairs on state 
sovereignty and the One China Policy60. The ‘One China Policy’ is the diplomatic 
                                                 
57 Michael Chege, “Economic relations between Kenya and China, 1963-2007”, 2006, https://csis-website-
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58 Ibid. 
59 Kennedy Mwengei, “A Study on the Impact of China's Investments in Africa; the Case of Kenya.” Finance 
Management, 23 Mar. 2013, www.elixirpublishers.com/articles/1364041481_56A (2013) 13706-13714.pdf. 
60 Ying Xia, “Chinese Agricultural and Manufacturing Investment in Kenya: a Scoping Study.” Chinese Africa 
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acknowledgment that there is only one Chinese government. Under this policy, the United States 
recognizes that it has formal ties with China and not Taiwan's island. China views Taiwan as a 
province that will be reunified with the Mainland in the future61. One reason Kenya is an ally to 
China in the One China policy is that there is no territorial dispute. Like most African countries, it 
does not present a direct threat to China’s national security. Furthermore, most African countries 
like Kenya do not support the efforts of Taiwan, Tibet or Xinjiang in their pursuit of independence 
from China62.  For instance, Kenya sided with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in a 
diplomatic competition between the PRC and the Taiwanese government in 2016. The Chinese 
government requested the Kenyan government to deport around 50 Taiwanese fraud suspects to 
Mainland China, regardless of the intense protests from Taiwan63. As a result of trading 
opportunities in the expanding economy, Kenya’s imports from China were rising in the 1990s64. 
Kenya has been a beneficiary of China’s development aid since the year of independence 
in 1963. Among the many instances where China assisted Kenya, one of the first notable assistance 
was with constructing the Moi International Sports Complex that was developed through a Chinese 
Yuan Renminbi (CNY) loan of approximately, KSH 1.16 billion in 1987.  Over the years, China 
has changed the forms of aid policies such as the change from liberation and grandiose projects to 
reducing debts, promotion of investment, and assistance in human resource development. 
                                                 
61 “What is the ‘One China policy?” Feb 10. 2017, BBC News, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-
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62 Yun Sun, “Africa in China’s foreign policy”, Brookings, Aril 12. 2016,  https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
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63 Ying Xia, “Chinese Agricultural and Manufacturing Investment in Kenya: a Scoping Study.” Chinese Africa 
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Following the elections in 2013, the current president, Uhuru Kenyatta decided to start borrowing 
money from China in a way that many people in the country view as reckless and have put the 
citizens in fear of being in a crippling amount of public debt65.  
Even before Kenya gained independence, Chinese migrants started moving to Kenya. The 
first wave of Chinese migrants came to Kenya during the 1950s and 1960s. Most of the Chinese 
migrants were from China’s coastal provinces like Fujian and Guangdong. As the Chinese 
migrants spent time in Kenya, they quickly realized that the foodservice industry did not require 
much capital and skill to start in Kenya. Consequently, many Chinese migrants not only began to 
work in but also own their Chinese restaurants. 
 As the years have progressed, the Chinese migrants have adjusted in Kenya. They have 
learned more about the Kenyan culture and understood the types of demands that Kenyans have 
for goods and services. As their businesses started to become lucrative, the migrants became 
entrepreneurs who ran small Chinese restaurants and eventually became traders and investors.  Due 
to the Chinese migrants' economic success, the second wave of Chinese immigration to Kenya 
soon followed from the 1990s and the early 2000s. This period is consistent with when China took 
a more active role in global trade66. Eventually, the number of Chinese communities began to 
increase in other major cities in Kenya, such as Mombasa, Kisumu, and Nakuru. These 
communities were appealing not only for businesses as they are still significant cities but also as 
tourist attraction sites. These cities are known for their tourist appeals such as the sandy beaches 
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in Mombasa, Lake Victoria in Kisumu, and Lake Nakuru in Nakuru, where there is also a national 
game park. These main areas of attraction are ideal for businesses as they automatically bring in 
foot traffic of the Kenyan middle and high class in business. Additionally, these businesses are 
suitable for tourists from outside of Kenya as well. 
During the first years after independence, Kenya pursued an import substitution (IS) 
strategy in which the government provided both direct support and tariff protection for the 
industrial sector. This strategy was a carryover from colonial policies. Its objectives were the rapid 
growth of the industry, the reduced balance of payment pressure, more indigenous participation in 
the sector, higher productivity, and high-income employment. Though this strategy was well-
intended, it was unable to create sustained work, and with the high import level, there was a 
significant problem of imbalance of payments67. Following these agreements, in 2007, there was 
a presidential election in Kenya that resulted in post-election violence. The post-election violence 
was systemically based on the inadequacies and inefficiencies with the electoral commission. The 
cause of the violence was also systematic as evidence in the ethnic-based violence.  
The post-election violence lasted for about two months which resulted in 1,133 deaths and 
100,000 displaced persons68. After the post-election violence, Kenya was not as attractive to 
foreign investors because of the corruption, violence, inadequate infrastructure, and reduced 
investment climate. However, the Chinese continued to offer aid that supported infrastructure 
development and improved education standards, both academic and technical, humanitarian relief, 
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and tariff exemptions. Other areas of assistance included the modernization of power distribution, 
rural electrification, water; renovation of sports facilities; provision of anti-malaria drugs; 
construction of a malaria research center, and the modernization of international airports Kenya69.   
3.2 Development of Kenya’s Economy 
Within the 50 years of the post-colonial era, Kenya has become the second-largest 
economy in the East African region, and it accounts for 19% of regional output70.  Kenya is also 
the fourth largest economy in Sub-Saharan Africa71. The leading sectors that drive the Kenyan 
economy include agriculture, services that include real estate and finance and manufacturing. 
These sectors made up 31.5%, 14.9% and 8.4% of gross domestic product (GDP) respectively in 
201772.  According to the World Bank’s Doing Business Index, Kenya has risen over 40 places to 
rank 80 in 201773.  The GDP growth is also projected to rise to 5.7% in 2018 due to the robust 
performance of the services sector and improved business confidence74.  
 According to the 2017 Attractiveness Index, Ernst &Young assessed Kenya as the second 
most attractive investment destination in Africa after Morocco. As this indicates that investors 
have been attracted to Kenya to a certain extent, the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) 
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figures for 2015 show that the sectors receiving the most investment were finance and insurance, 
information and communication, manufacturing and retail75. The infrastructure, horticulture, oil 
and gas, and tourism sectors have all attracted significant investment from foreign companies76.  
 While there are private sectors in the economy that are led and dominated by a small 
number of large firms, 82.7% of the country’s employment, businesses and entrepreneurs are from 
the informal sector77. Kenya’s informal sector is also known as ‘Jua Kali’ which means fierce sun 
in Swahili, and it represents the artisanal makers who have various types of workshops such as 
trade auto parts, repair and maintenance shops, material supply, furniture, handicrafts, and many 
other consumer and capital goods under minimal protection and regulation from the government78. 
Other examples of small informal businesses include farming, food vending, shop-keeping, selling 
clothes and beauty products, manufacturing, and craft. 
Other sectors contributing to economic growth are building and construction, infrastructure 
development, manufacturing, transport, services, tourism (particularly from emerging markets); 
agriculture, wholesale and retail. The small and medium-sized enterprises, also known as SMEs, 
form a part of the formal economy and are characterized by some degree of specialization. These 
enterprises manufacture a wide range of items that include wood, furniture, metal products, glass 
and pottery, clothing, and leather products. The products are tailored to meet the domestic needs 
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of low-income households, although some of these products are exported to neighboring 
countries79.  
The tropical climate and abundant fertile land have made agriculture the principle leading 
contributor to Kenya’s domestic economy.  Agriculture accounts for 26% of the gross domestic 
product and another 27% indirectly through other sectors80.  More than 40% of the total population 
is employed in the agricultural sector and more than 70% of those employed live in the rural 
areas81.  Furthermore, agriculture is what the majority of Kenyans depend on as their sources of 
livelihood. The sector includes the production of crops, horticulture, livestock, fisheries, and 
forestry. Crop production and horticulture alone contribute 76.5% of agriculture GDP followed by 
livestock production at 4.9%82. Foreign investors have also demonstrated great interest in Kenya’s 
agricultural industry83.  
The major agricultural products in Kenya include tea, coffee, horticulture, corn, wheat, 
sugarcane, dairy products, beef, pork, poultry, sisal, cotton, fruits, vegetables and eggs84.  Tea and 
horticulture are the primary foreign exchange-earners. The industrial activity that processes most 
of these agricultural products takes place in Kenya's major cities, being Nairobi, Mombasa, and 
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Kisumu. It focuses on food-processing such as grain milling, beer production, sugarcane crushing, 
and customer goods fabrication. Kenya also had an oil refinery that processed imported crude 
petroleum into petroleum products that were mainly used for the domestic market in 2015 and then 
stopped when it became uneconomical run85.  
The tourism sector is the third-largest contributor to the GDP after agriculture and 
horticulture in Kenya and is the leading foreign exchange earner. Kenya has numerous tourist 
attractions such as the national parks, mountains, sandy beaches in the coast region of Kenya, etc. 
The tourism sector benefits from the attractions and it also impacts other aspects of the service 
industry, such as hotel services, restaurants, and many more. Additionally, tourists can also support 
the local small businesses that sell various kinds of traditional African art and souvenirs. Travel 
and tourism have accounted for 8.8% of the nation’s gross domestic product in 201886.  Kenya is 
currently the third largest tourism economy in Sub-Saharan Africa after South Africa and Nigeria, 
according to the Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife87.  
      Ever since fiber optics were introduced in the Kenyan economy in 2009, Kenya has 
been a game-changer in the Information and Technology sector. Fiber optics has set the momentum 
for Information, Communications and Technology (ICT) investments and has benefited Kenya 
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more than most of its neighboring countries88. According to figures from the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Report, in 2017, FDI 
inflows into Kenya were US$672m. 
The FDI inflows were driven principally by investments into the ICT sector89.  Along with 
attracting investors, Kenya has been nicknamed “Silicon Savannah.” Thus, Kenya has become the 
second most innovative country in sub-Saharan Africa according to the World Intellectual Property 
Organization’s Global Innovation Index 201990.  
3.3 Chinese Investment in Kenya 
Kenya has been receiving Chinese support for multiple road infrastructure projects since 2006. 
During President Mwai Kibaki’s era, he signed a grant of 510,000,000 Kenyan shillings (KSh) 
under an economic and technical co-operation agreement. China later extended concessional loans 
and grants to Kenya under the agreement on economic and technological co-operation, which 
included the Northern and Eastern Bypass road projects for KSh 8.5 billion and KSh 2.16 billion, 
respectively. Many other road construction agreements were signed by President Mwai Kibaki, 
including the Thika highway, flyovers, and underpasses. The roadwork comprised an eight-lane 
motorway and flyovers as well as underpasses designed to decongest the traffic. 
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China announced Sino- Africa industrial cooperation in 2015, and Kenya was one of the pilot 
countries. President Xi Jinping proposed ten major cooperation plans for 2016-2019, the first three 
of which covered industrialization, agricultural modernization, and infrastructure. These 
cooperation plans were meant to be supported by a series of financial and political commitments 
by the Chinese government91. This demonstrates how interested China has been to invest in Kenya.  
Kenya’s goal has also been to have sustainable development, and economic growth. 
According to Ndubuisi Ekekwe, Chairman of Fasmicro Group, “African leaders have expected 
that as China rises further, its wage levels will create disincentives for global manufacturers to 
continue sending work there92.”   Ndubuisi Ekekwe said, “As that happens, they hope countries 
like Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Kenya can be seen as reliable alternatives that provide affordable labor 
with enough infrastructures for basic manufacturing93.”  
Due to the relationship between Africa and China, African leaders have been pursuing policies 
designed to mimic the path China took. After years of seeing the development and success that 
China has had as a country, many African countries believe and continue to think that the same 
growth and success is also available to them if they follow the same path. The path that China took 
developmentally is highly desirable because China designed and executed a policy that shrank the 
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industrialization process in a mere 25 years — something that many economies took at least a 
century to do94.  
Therefore, the Kenyan government’s overarching vision for 2030 is to make Kenya 
globally competitive and prosper the nation with high quality of life.95.  
With this vision in hand, its government has sought to work with China. This partnership 
with China will grant Kenya access to critical Chinese exports such as telecommunication 
equipment, electrical machinery, civil engineering equipment, motor, and transport vehicles, 
rubber tires, motorcycles, and iron and steel products, household electric appliances, textile goods, 
commodities for daily use, building materials and drugs96.  
Due to the rise in partnership with China, there have been other unexpected results as well. 
Over recent years, there has been an increase in Chinese companies' involvement and investment 
in Kenya. There are more than 70 large Chinese companies doing business in Kenya, the largest 
among them being Jiangsu International Economic and Technological Cooperation Co., China 
Road Bridge Construction Corporation, and China Import and Export Group97.  
However, the fact that China's industrial development took place in a communist country 
should be considered. China's ability to industrialize should not be used as a 'one size fits all' 
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program. One reason for China's quick success in industrial development was the mindset of the 
Chinese Communist society.  Chairman Mao Zedong said, "At no time and in no circumstances 
should a communist place his interests first; he should subordinate to the nation's interest and the 
masses. Hence selfishness, slacking, corruption, seeking the limelight are most contemptible, 
while working with all one's energy, wholehearted devotion to public duty, and quiet hard work 
will command respect98.” Thus the work ethic and motivation come from the sense of duty to 
benefit the community without hesitation. This kind of mindset has been with the Chinese for 
decades. Thus it is unrealistic to expect that the Kenyans would be able to completely change their 
way of life and thinking to mimic China’s industrial development process.   
China is attracted to investing in Kenya because China’s growing economy is thirsty for 
sustainable supplies of mineral resources99. Hence, the Chinese government had decided to 
empower and support several domestic state-owned and private companies to pursue mining deals 
throughout the world100.  The mining deals that China employs in Africa are very diverse and often 
involve direct investments in mining projects, infrastructure, mineral resources “trade-in” deals, 
joint ventures, indirect investments, off-take agreements etc.101.  However, if the main issue with 
China’s aid is the access to Kenya’s raw materials and markets and the export of natural resources 
out of Kenya, this will hurt Kenya’s economy in the long run by undermining the ability of the 
local firms to exploit the same markets and resources102.  Given Kenya’s geographical advantage 
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and comparative strength in political stability and economic development, Kenya is considered the 
continent’s focal point in China’s “One-Belt-One-Road” policy103.  
The Chinese government is hoping that when the BRI is fully operational, it will benefit 
the oil export from Uganda and South Sudan, whose conflicts with the Republic of Sudan have 
made it challenging to export oil to China and other countries. As a result of the challenges in 
exporting oil from Sudan, the Chinese want to use the Kenyan route that would facilitate the 
shipping of oil from Sudan, so that the China’s investment in Sudanese oil can bear fruit104. 
Another reason for China’s investment in Kenya is that China views Kenya as a gateway to the 
East African region and the focal point of China’s trade and economic strategy in Africa105.   
Similarly, the discovery of oil fields in Northern Uganda has diversified oil import source 
markets for China. Because Uganda is a land-locked country and is neighboring Kenya, with the 
secure Kenyan route, China can advance the MSR into the African hinterland in the future106. The 
Kenyan government sees this as a great opportunity as they believe that the MSR will increase the 
volume of exports and jobs and foster cultural and people to people exchange while creating a vast 
interconnected economic zone107. Moreover, China is currently offering favorable loans to Kenya 
to construct hospitals and schools in less developed areas. China has malaria prevention and 
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control centers as well as providing volunteers to train people108.  All these gestures of goodwill 
are used to support China’s investments based on Kenya’s best interest and Kenya’s rapid 
development.  However, the overall adverse effects of Chinese investments is quite alarming. In 
March 2018, the Washington-based Centre for Global Development identified Kenya as one of the 
three African countries at risk of debt distress as a result of its Belt and Road participation109.    
The increase in China’s role in Kenya has created heated debates between economists not 
only from Kenya and internationally, whether the Belt Road Initiative will bring substantial 
development. The debt level is the most concerning and has made many people skeptical as the 
public debt surpasses $50 BN, making Kenya become the 5th indebted country in Africa110. There 
have been claims that China is using “debt-trap diplomacy” to accomplish its foreign policy 
agenda111.  
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 4 Findings 
4.1 Positive Impacts of Chinese Investments in the Kenyan Economy 
Chinese investment in Kenya has shown some positive aspects. As noted in a World Bank 
report, Chinese businesses in Kenya employ, on average, 360 local employees, far higher than the 
average 147 local employees employed in other foreign-invested enterprises in Kenya. The 
investment has also provided students with scholarships through China’s Xinhua News Agency 
set up a branch office in Nairobi since 1985. Furthermore, China has provided significant aid or 
low-interest loans to fund the construction of the Moi International Sports Center and methane 
generating pits, the expansion of Eldoret Hospital, and building the Gambogi-Serem Highway, 
among other projects112.  
The positive impacts are also seen in infrastructure and government projects.  In the past, 
government construction projections in Kenya were characterized by inefficiency and these 
projects took longer than expected due to shoddy work, corruption and procrastination113. Many 
Kenyans have been impressed by how quickly the Chinese can work and complete tasks such as 
constructing roads and buildings in Kenya. Thus, compared to the Kenyan government projects, 
the Chinese workers show how their projects can be completed quickly and cheaply. The local 
Kenyan response has been one of approval and even amazement as it has also challenged the 
Kenyan companies to improve on their service quality.  Through these actions, China has earned 
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much community trust in Kenya and is known for helping create a favorable local business 
environment.   
Western media, particularly the United States, expresses its skepticism about China’s 
involvement in Kenya and views it as a form of ‘debt-trap diplomacy’114. The idea of debt-trap 
diplomacy is rooted in the anxiety of China’s rise as a global power rather than Africa's reality. 
For instance, Evan Feigenbaum of the Paulson Institute think tanks writes that treasury secretary 
Steven Mnuchin has counseled countries against taking Chinese money, warning it will lead 
countries into a debilitating cycle of debt, and asset stripping115.” 
 Chinese companies have also had a positive influence in the country as they produce 
quality work, enhance competitiveness, and encourage discipline to deliver within deadlines, 
which has helped Kenya achieve its infrastructure development goals116.  In Kenya today, there are 
many new roads, railways, power grids, and ports built in Kenya at previously unthinkable speeds. 
Kenya inaugurated a $3.2 billion railway, funded by China that links the Capital city Nairobi to 
Mombasa's port. The railway is the biggest infrastructure project since its independence 50 years 
ago117.  
The Standard Gauge Railway (SGR), was built with a symbolic meaning behind it as well. 
It will replace the current railway built by the British colonialists, which was known as a 
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‘monumental folly”. The symbolism is quite apparent as President Uhuru Kenyatta named the new 
railway line the ‘Madaraka Express,’ which was named after the Independence Day, June 1st when 
Kenya gained its independence from Britain. President Kenyatta seems to be celebrating the new 
SGR and the freedom from British colonialism; however, many Kenyans fear that they are 
introducing a new colonial power, China118.  
In the manufacturing sector of Kenya’s economy, many products are being exported from 
China at a significantly lower price than products produced by European or American companies. 
The imports of cheaper Chinese products have enabled the Kenyan consumer to purchase these 
products which were never accessible to them in the past119. Some Kenyan consumers, such as the 
more impoverished population now can afford cell phones and other electronics. Access to cheap 
cell phones may have improved small businesses, and the overall quality of life by making 
communication easier. Along with the cheap electronics and cell phones, Chinese cars and auto-
parts have been dominating the roads120. These are just a few examples products that Kenyans 
have increased access to due to the affordability of such products from China. For many in Kenya, 
this has led to an improvement in the quality of life.  
Due to the massive amounts of borrowed money, many have criticized this project to be 
putting Kenya into significant debt. However, the positive aspect of the SGR is that since the 
railway started transporting passengers and goods in 2017, the gross domestic product has risen a 
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whole percentage point to 6.5 percent. The new railway has led to increased volumes of freight 
and faster clearing of cargo from Mombasa's port to the hinterland, which has saved costs and time 
that fuels economic activity121.  The same journey on the former railway built by the British 
colonialists used to take 12 hours to travel the 472 kilometers but now takes only four hours. 
Therefore, businesses in Kenya are saving time and cutting costs. Also, passengers are enjoying a 
faster, cheaper and safer journey, and the increased freight-carrying capacity reduces wear and tear 
on the roads in the long run122.  
4.2 Negative Impact of the Chinese Investments in the Kenyan Economy 
Despite the positive results from the Maritime Silk Road initiative, the Kenyan government 
still has a responsibility to ensure that the Chinese firms do not profit at the Kenyan indigenous 
firms' expense. Policies and international agreements regarding the China-Kenya socioeconomic 
relationship must be a win-win for both countries. This section of the paper will provide 
information on how the manufacturing, textile, garment, agricultural, and artisanal 'Jua Kali' 
industries have been negatively affected by Chinese investments. It will also examine reported 
cases of labor laws, environmental laws, and discrimination of Kenyan employees. 
 Many Kenyans thought that deepening their relations with China and allowing them to 
invest in Kenya would provide more jobs for the Kenyans and training. However, a World Bank 
Research paper states that Chinese firms tend to rely on their low-cost labor and do not invest 
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heavily in the training and education of African workers123. This business practice by Chinese 
firms has continued to hurt the development of local job markets. The negative impact of this 
practice goes beyond the singular construction project that is passed up for Kenyans.  Plenty of 
Kenyan educated and skilled local people who could use the work experience are also losing these 
opportunities and are left jobless or forced to migrate to other countries to find a use for their 
education and skills, which leads to brain drain. Therefore, it has been suggested that in future 
infrastructure projects between China and African countries, a deal should be settled before 
starting the contract, on the percentage of local workers for technical and managerial staff to 
facilitate the capacity building of local workforce in Africa and ensure win-win cooperation 
between China and African countries in the long run124.  
4.2.1 Environmental Laws 
A negative aspect of many Chinese companies is their disregard for Kenya's domestic 
regulations and policies, which is complicating and delaying matters. For instance, the railway 
line's construction was controversial as the railway passed through the Nairobi National Park. The 
Nairobi National Park is iconic to Kenya and home to wildlife such as lions, hyenas, and giraffes 
roaming in an area. The wildlife was already facing pressures from a burgeoning city but now had 
to deal with the railway construction and the accompanying infrastructure demands. The Kenyan 
conservationists thus resulted in a protest after a court order had already halted constructing a 
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railway line inside Nairobi's famed national park since 2016125. A coalition of interested parties 
appealed to the social environment tribunal in 2016, complaining about public participation.  
Despite the legal battles that were going on addressing the legality of the railway construction 
through the national park, the China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) continued to use cranes 
and heavy machinery, while working inside an area guarded by armed rangers126. While the 
conservationists insisted that the order to halt the construction was in place, they were told by the 
Kenya Wildlife Services (KWS) that the development was taking place legally. Jim Karani, a legal 
affairs manager of Wildlife Direct, who had been involved in the litigation, said, “What we have 
seen here is a hell-bent government on getting its way and building this project even in defiance 
of court”127. 
4.2.2 Labor Laws 
There have been countless Chinese companies discriminating against local workers and 
violating the local law and provisions. In 2007, the Kenyan government passed Kenya's 
Employment Act to ensure equal employment and protect local workers' health, safety, and 
welfare. Many of the Chinese employers have been known to ignore the domestic worker's rights 
in Kenya. By supporting the corrupt and/ dictatorial regimes in Kenya, these employers can 
circumvent the local labor laws and provision128.  For instance, China Bridge and Road Corporation 
(CBRC), a state-owned Chinese construction company, which is also the most significant Chinese 
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enterprise in Kenya, has been accused of firing workers without a cause, importing labor, stealing 
water from local communities and dredging sand discretely from Kenyan beaches for construction 
material129.  
  Language barriers are considered to be the leading cause of misunderstandings between 
the labor office and the employees130. For instance, if an employee misunderstands an order from 
the employer and does the wrong thing, the employer is likely to dismiss the employee.  As a 
result, the employees can become greatly offended and result in labor strikes131. Being unfamiliar 
with the Kenyan employment system also contributes to labor disputes. However, Chinese 
companies investing in Kenya should be expected to learn about the country's customs and laws 
before conducting their business. Language barriers, misunderstandings about cultures and 
regulations, and other miscommunication forms force employees to turn to labor unions. Even for 
the MSR's future progress, ineffective communication is considered a significant hurdle for its 
future development132.  Yet the lack of communication goes beyond cultural education and labor 
unions. In a labor strike in 2018, a labor officer complained that “Chinese companies are hard to 
reach because they always try to confuse the meeting by pretending that they don’t understand 
English133.”  
4.2.3 Manufacturing Sector 
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China’s investment in the Kenyan economy's manufacturing sector has concentrated on 
activities such as building materials and light manufacturing, intending to serve growing domestic 
markets in Kenya and neighboring countries134.  China has now become the largest financer for 
infrastructure in Africa as it funds one in five projects and constructs every third project according 
to a Deloitte report135.  Due to the infrastructure needs that the African Development Bank 
estimates at $130 billion to $170 billion yearly, governments are only too willing to take out 
Chinese loans to plug the funding gap136. The Kenyan government took a multibillion shilling loan 
it received from China Exim Bank to build the gauge railway (SGR) in the Mombasa Port. The 
loan left the cash-flush Kenya Ports Authority (KPA) exposed to seizure by the Chinese in a 
default137. There has also been a leaked report that shows that the Kenyan Government waived the 
port’s sovereign immunity in 2013, to use it as a security for the Chinese loan. 
One of the disadvantages of the competition that the Chinese companies have brought into 
the Kenyan manufacturing market is that the local small businesses cannot compete against the 
cheap Chinese imports. The average buyer prefers to buy the goods that are cheaper and that meet 
their needs. Although cheap goods from China can be beneficial to the local buyer as they are 
easily accessible, the reality is that the local Kenyan business owner has challenges keeping up 
with such competition from the Chinese companies. 
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4.2.4 Textile Industry 
As for the textile industry, business owners complain that China's cheap goods are 
threatening the number of good manufacturing jobs available to Kenyan workers.  The Kenyan 
business owners would like the Kenyan government to control the flow of imports and tax the 
imported goods138. The head of African Cotton Textile and Textile Industries Federation, Rajeev 
Arora, said government policies are partly to blame for not providing a suitable economic 
environment so the local textile industries can compete with China on the price of the clothing139. 
He said, “We keep saying China is a competitor, China is the country which is destroying the 
market, China is the one which has created this distortion of cost, which has been quite true, "Arora 
said. “But we keep forgetting it’s also us who are not able to build our own competition for China 
by upgrading our standard of production or technology or productivity or methodology to bring 
our cost down and our quality up"140. 
The local textile manufacturing sector suffers from competition from cheap Chinese 
imports. However, a greater issue is that the Chinese have duplicated the local goods and have 
been flooding the Kenyan market with duplicates manufactured from China141. An example of a 
duplicate' traditional item' found in Kenyan markets is the fabrics known as the 'Kitenge.' 'Kitenge' 
is a term that encompasses Dutch wax print and other more modern takes on traditional patterns 
from around the continent. The best-selling brand of the kitenge in Kenya is called Anningtex, 
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which happens to be produced in China. Not many people know this fact and the local vendors are 
usually unwilling to let the customer know where it is being produced142.  
Many Chinese manufacturers have been known to take photos of the local product and 
produce it with the same designs. Taking pictures allows them to utilize Chinese manufacturing's 
cheap labor costs while still making a profit despite selling the products at a lower price. From a 
BBC interview, Nicholas Makombi expressed the following; “they used to come here and take 
photos of our products. Then they go and produce almost the same designs, and they sell it at a 
cheaper price”143. Many small business owners in Kenya are unable to keep up with such 
competition from the duplicates made. Unlike Chinese manufacturers, the Kenyans do not have 
the capital or machinery to produce cheaper goods at similar price points. 
4.2.5 Jua Kali Sector 
The artisanal makers in the informal sector, ‘Jua Kali’, is also affected by the duplication 
of products in China. Historically and culturally, a ‘Jua kali’ entrepreneur is known to be 
resourceful, creative and driven, and these qualities allow them to produce goods and services that 
help them earn a living. However, with the increase in competition, if a ‘Jua Kali’ carpenter 
decided to design and assemble a chair, he could quickly find dozens of replicas of his handcrafted 
and unique chair being sold on the roadside. When ideas are stolen so fast, it can discourage and  
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Inhibit invention144. Creating an extremely low-cost job was the ‘jua kali’ sector’s greatest 
strength. However, as a result of the competition, it is challenging for any enterprise to accumulate 
enough capital to operate on their own as a private shop145. 
4.2.6 Agriculture Sector 
 The agriculture sector is also affected negatively in Kenya. One of the most significant 
agricultural issues is the flood of cheap garlic imports from China. The average Kenyan garlic 
farmer is finding the competition too challenging. Currently, eighty percent of the garlic in the 
Kenyan market is from China146. A Kenyan farmer named Munyua says, “Chinese garlic should 
be taxed high so that the Kenyan farmer can earn something.” He also questions the “win-win” 
notion that underpins the relationship is a reality. Munyua asks, “Is it beneficial for the common 
man?” Claiming that one group benefits the most from China’s presence in Kenya. "The 
politicians147." Despite the negative impact of Chinese investments, not every Chinese migrant is 
sent by the Chinese government or works with them, many Chinese migrants are in Kenya as 
private entrepreneurs. However, as many businesses are being affected, it can affect how the 
Kenyans view the Chinese altogether.  
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4.2.7 Dumping of Chinese imports 
 The impact of Chinese investment and aid to Kenya has been mixed. The low import 
prices of Chinese goods have reduced monopolistic tendencies among Kenyan enterprises. Yet, 
employees and firms are negatively affected by the influx of cheap products. These effects in turn 
trickle down to the national economy with both gains and losses148. According to a 2018 survey 
conducted by Ipsos Synovate, many Kenyans had an unfavorable perception of China because of 
the threats posed by the cheap goods, for fear of fostering corruption and leading to job losses149. 
A total of 38% of Kenyans think that continued relationship between Kenya and China will lead 
to job losses150.  
 With increased imports and dumping of cheap goods comes increased competition where 
local producers go at a loss and eventually lead to many businesses and firms collapsing because 
they cannot stand the competition. Thus, many local employees who work for local firms, lose 
their jobs. One of the shocking statistics is that in 2015, Chinese exports to Kenya reached US$ 
5.9 billion, increasing by 20 percent compared to 2014; meanwhile, Kenyan exports to China 
witnessed a 28 percent increase, reaching US$ 100 million151. The primary beneficiaries of these 
profits are the Chinese entrepreneurs and the African elites that partner with them and help them 
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by arranging for access and resources. The average Kenyan worker is there to provide cheap labor 
along the way152. 
 Currently, these practices, to a certain extent, have hurt the relationship between the 
Kenyans and the Chinese. Some business owners have started to see the Chinese as a threat, which 
creates hostility. For example, an area known as Eastleigh or “little Mogadishu,” is known for the 
Somali population and for being a place of trade. Ninety percent of the goods that are sold there 
are from China153. Mohamed Ali, who owns a menswear shop says, “The more cheap imports from 
China arrive in the market, the slower the business gets with more stores selling the same 
things”154. Neil Carrier, author of a book on Eastleigh, Little Mogadishu: Eastleigh, Nairobi’s 
Global Somali Hub says, “It’s more about surviving these days when in the past it was about 
thriving155.”  
 There is youth unemployment in Kenya at a crisis, and it currently stands at 22%. Many 
Kenyans blame the high levels of unemployment on the influx of Chinese investment, and there is 
a growing problem of mutual distrust between the Kenyan and the Chinese workers. The majority 
of the Kenyans believe that the Chinese project managers are inhibiting the skills that would 
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eventually lead Kenyans to take the lead156.  The Chinese Ambassador to Kenya, Sun Bohong 
attributed the delay in redistributing jobs to Kenyans to a language barrier157. 
However, language barriers are not accepted as the main reason for the delay of 
redistribution of jobs to Kenyans. Historically, and currently, there are numerous accounts of abuse 
of Kenyan employees under Chinese managers. In a widely-read New York Times piece published 
in October 2018, Kenyans described Chinese supervisors who directed racial slurs towards their 
Kenyan employees. The Kenyan workers interviewed in the article accused their bosses of barring 
them from operating trains unless a journalist is there to capture the moment. 
 
4.3 The Role of the Kenyan Government in Facilitating the Chinese 
Investments. 
4.3.1 The Political Background 
President Uhuru Kenyatta won a second presidential term in August 2017. However, a month later, 
the court annulled the results due to technical issues in the votes' processing. President Uhuru still 
won the re-run in October 2017, despite the opposition group held by Raila Odinga by boycotting 
the polls. The re-run led to fear of a repeat of post-election violence in 2007/ 2008, due to similar 
ethnic issues158.  
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 President Kenyatta had formerly branded his government as the ‘digital generation’ during 
his first presidential term in 2013. He planned to ease business regulations, reform the tax code, 
and improve the infrastructure, especially the energy supply and transport networks. For his second 
presidential term, President Kenyatta has promoted a more socially oriented program known as 
the “Big Four” agenda, which focuses on manufacturing, universal healthcare, affordable housing, 
and food security159. According to a recommendation from the World Bank, the government 
should reprioritize and enhance public spending efficiency if it wants to make the Big Four agenda 
a success160. 
 Historically, politics in Kenya was based on the formation of alliances between Kenya’s 
main ethnic groups. There are 24 ethnic groups in Kenya, and the largest ones are the Kikuyu, 
Luhya, Kalenjin, Luo, and Kamba. In total, they make up 66% of the population161. Thus, when 
they get into ethnic conflicts, it can become devastating, such as the post-election violence in 
2007/2008. This way of conducting politics leads to a zero-sum game in which groups compete 
for the state's resources, which exacerbates the tensions during the election period162.  
 There are officials in Kenya who defend President Kenyatta’s borrowing spree. They 
believe that it is part of the efforts to upgrade the infrastructure investment, expand energy options 
and distribution, and improve transportation systems.  However, critics argue that the increase in 
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lending from China will lead to dependency and could have the potential to entrap the nation in 
debt163. All the adverse effects that have resulted from the Chinese investments should not be 
entirely blamed on the Chinese government. The Kenyan government also shares responsibility in 
signing the agreements and policies that are being carried out today. Similarly, the Kenyan 
government shares responsibility in setting up the law and enforcing laws to protects its citizens.  
In 2001, Kenya created the Labor Law Reform Agenda to promote equity and equality in the 
workplace.  The Kenyan government must enforce these current labor laws and also pass more 
laws to protect against future violations by Chinese employers164.  
One of the main problems and issues is that Kenya's government has not been transparent 
with the deals and agreements it has been making with China.  For instance, Kenya's citizens were 
not informed of the initial deal for the Mombasa-Nairobi railway, which was signed on May 11, 
2014.  The deal's details revealed that the pact would be governed by Chinese laws, with all 
disputes being arbitrated in Beijing. Also, the contract even has a confidentiality clause gagging 
Kenya from making the deal public, without permission from the lender, China165.  For many 
Kenyans, the confidential clause raises a lot of suspicion within the country.  
The people of Kenya recently found out that Kenya may lose Mombasa, its largest and 
most developed port if it cannot pay back the loan from China166. This news came as a shock to 
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most Kenyans because it is something they never thought would be put on the line as collateral. 
As the SGR agreement states, “Neither the borrower (Kenya) nor any of its assets is entitled to any 
right of immunity on the grounds of sovereignty or otherwise from arbitration, suit, execution or 
any other legal process concerning its obligations under this Agreement, as the case may be in any 
jurisdiction,” Clause 5.5 of the Preferential Buyer Credit Loan Agreement on the Mombasa-
Nairobi SGR reads167. Also, Kenya is compelled to import goods, technology, and service from 
China. These are a few of the conditions in these agreements that were made between the Kenyan 
and Chinese governments.  
The citizens of Kenya are expected to continue their skepticism of Chinese involvement 
and investment, but it may also be leading to the distrust of the Kenyan government. Some 
sympathizers may argue that Kenya was in a vulnerable position, and China was using a form of 
soft power. Still, ultimately it was the Kenyan government who chose to take the deal. 
Furthermore, Kenya is known to be a country with a lot of corruption. The East African Bribery 
Index illustrates the extent of the problem across Kenyan society as a whole. The index ranked the 
police (83.3/100), judiciary (44/100) and land services (41.7/100) as the most bribery prone 
institutions in Kenya, with a score of 100 indicating the worst score across five measures of 
bribery168. With the current policies and agreements in place in Kenya, elites from the Agikuyu 
and Kalenjin clusters group of the African elite members may benefit from the China and Kenya 
relations more than the local Kenyan169. The ethnic elites have been able to maintain their position 
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due to the networking among themselves by sharing information and assistance on opportunities 
in the capitalist sector170.  
These opaque deals work for many recipient governments as they let them build visible 
projects, which helps them win elections. The arrangements are also a source of income for corrupt 
politicians and their supporters171.  Anzetse Were, a development economist said, "African 
governments may be happy with the opacity, but African publics are not.” She also says, 
“Fundamentally, the sentiments on the ground are really going to inform how successful and how 
well received their initiatives are in the country as a whole172."  High levels of background 
corruption have adverse effects on a country’s economic performance by reducing institutional 
quality, undermining competitiveness and entrepreneurship, distorting credit allocation, and acting 
as a barrier to trade173.  
Corruption has a long-term harmful impact on the regulatory environment and the state 
apparatus's efficiency as it creates incentives for politicians and public officials to create more 
regulations, restrictions, and administrative procedures to have more opportunities to extort 
payments from citizens and companies. This form of corruption, in turn, is likely to exacerbate 
rent-seeking behavior and breed inefficiencies across the public sector174.  The closely related 
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problems of corruption, insecurity and political mismanagement have all held the economy back 
from achieving its potential175. 
 Kenya's current partnership with China has both positively and negatively 
impacted Kenya's economy. The issues that negatively impact Kenya's economy, such as cheap 
Chinese products, do not put the blame solely on China or absolve the Kenya government. 
Chinese manufacturers, Chinese firms, and the Chinese government have taken advantage of the 
system's loopholes. Yet there is still hope that the Chinese loans to Kenya could be put to good 
use. However, the political corruption in the Kenyan government and the current foreign and 
labor policies may hinder Kenya from developing economically as quickly as desired. 
 
 5 Implications 
5.1 Conclusion 
This paper has examined the positive and negative impacts of Chinese investments in the 
Kenyan economy. The conclusion is that both China and Kenya are responsible for the 
implications and outcomes. The root causes of Kenya's current economic problem is corruption, 
opaque deals, and not being transparent to the public, racism, and discrimination in the workplace, 
unfair competition in the market, unemployment, and debt. This thesis aims not to portray the 
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Chinese investments and partnerships between China and Kenya in a negative light. Instead, the 
purpose is to reveal that China's aid and assistance are not based on genuine care and interest for 
Kenyan people. Therefore, the Kenyan government should sign the agreements with China, and 
make policies that ensure mutual benefit and does not put the Kenyan economy at a disadvantage 
or mortgage its future. 
One of the first steps in ensuring that the Kenyan government can sign agreements that are 
beneficial to the Kenyan economy is by being transparent with the public about the terms and 
conditions. The Kenyan government should implement policies that ensure bilateral arrangements 
are made public so that the general public can vet projects. Moreover, other agencies such as 
Parliament, legislators, and state auditors should also exercise vigorous oversight roles and 
demand transparency on debt terms and spending plans176. Since China is one of the main source 
of FDI, Kenya should try to attract FDI from other sources as well, in order to avoid dependency 
on China177. If the Kenyan public is more involved in the decision-making process and better 
informed about the terms of the agreements made, Kenyans can decide for themselves and push 
for politicians that will genuinely benefit Kenya’s development.  
It is also imperative that Kenya and the Chinese government form new regulations to create 
a win-win situation. The Kenyan government needs to cultivate a political environment where such 
negotiations can take place. Mutual respect should be cultivated, commitment and cooperation to 
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remove the doubts and distrust between them178. It would be helpful if the Kenyan government 
renegotiated with the Chinese government to ensure that Kenya can gain more from the current 
investments in infrastructure. The renegotiation is critical as the infrastructure aid for Kenya’s 
projects is currently tied to China’s construction companies and importing the materials from 
china179. These policies are affecting and will continue to affect the local Kenyan employers and 
employees by blocking them out of the bidding process for government projects and even sourcing 
materials and labor from China. As it stands, it costs more for Kenyans to outsource and pay for 
the Chinese operated projects. Thus, China should ‘untie’ the development assistance it provides 
to Kenya so that more Kenyan local firms can bid on the infrastructure projects and insist on local 
participation in Chinese funded infrastructure projects180.  
 To increase employment and economic opportunities, policymakers need to consider the 
labor-intensive local industries. For instance, local manufacturers missed a valuable opportunity 
for capacity building, knowledge sharing, and long-term job creation for the SGR project. 
Policymakers are crucial in designing policies to help form linkages between small Kenyan firms, 
technical institutes, and Chinese contractors, treating the SGR project as a learning experience. 
With more significant ties, future infrastructure projects can draw from a larger pool of skilled 
labor and cut its costs181.  
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 The government agencies should also put up measures such as raising tariffs on imports 
and ban the imports through policy rules, to avoid dumping of Chinese products and duplicates 
that cause local manufacturers to go at a loss. To ensure this measure is taken, the Kenya Bureau 
of Standards and the anti-counterfeit agency should create awareness to buy substandard goods. 
Furthermore, the Kenyan government needs to improve the local market by promoting Kenyan 
products182.  Majority of the Kenyan products come from the informal ‘Jua kali’ sector, which has 
provided employment for 80% of the labor force over the years183. In 1956, the Kenyan 
government wrote of the informal sector as a powerful channel for economic growth. The 
government’s sessional Paper No. 1 of 1986, for example stated, “Obviously the modern, urban, 
industrial sector cannot be dependent on to employ much of the growing work force. To employ 
people on small farms, in very small-scale industry and services, or self-employment takes only a 
fraction of the £ 16,000 per worker required in the formal sector. Clearly the bulk of the work force 
will have to be productively employed in these activities184.”  
 Despite how the government in the 1950’s viewed the informal sector, it focused on 
developing export processing zones (EPZs) and established formal enterprises, providing 
incentives such as 10- year tax withholding, expedited project approval and business inputs such 
as machinery185. The EPZ program does not benefit the 'Jua Kali' sector, as no technology or capital 
is transferred. There have also been cases where policemen have been accused of harassing those 
who work in the 'Jua Kali' sector. The harassment adds to the challenges for running their 
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enterprises amidst the competitive market environment. The Kenyan government should believe 
in its citizens and invest in the local way of conducting business instead of completely following 
the modernization approach. The Kenyan government must commit to empowering the 'jua kali' 
sector by providing sheds, electricity, and other incentives, so the industry that makes up most of 
the labor force can grow, leading to an overall improvement of the economy and standard of living.  
               Most importantly, China must be held accountable for the dumping of cheap imports, 
violating labor laws, and other practices that are harming Kenya's economy.  These business 
practices, trade agreements, and policies by the Chinese government are not just impacting Kenya, 
but are also practiced in East Africa.  As Kenya is considered China’s gateway to East Africa, 
Kenya’s own leverage also includes China’s ability to access all of East Africa’s resources such 
as Uganda’s oil fields. For the present and the future of Kenya's economy, the Kenyan government 
should always involve the East African Community (EAC) in viewing its agreements with China.  
As Kenya is already part of the East African Community (EAC), Kenya has a unique opportunity 
to partner with the other countries in Africa to pressure China to make economic concessions and 
guarantee mutually profitable growth for both countries. By doing so, Kenya's government can 
solve their current and future financial problems and create a better future for all Kenyans186.  
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